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Abstract
We show that Skilling’s method of induction leads to a unique general
theory of inductive inference, the method of Maximum relative Entropy
(ME). The main tool for updating probabilities is the logarithmic relative
entropy; other entropies such as those of Renyi or Tsallis are ruled out.
We also show that Bayes updating is a special case of ME updating and
thus, that the two are completely compatible.
1 Introduction
The method of Maximum (relative) Entropy (ME) [1, 2, 3] is designed for up-
dating probabilities when new information is given in the form of a constraint
on the family of allowed posteriors. This is in contrast with the older MaxEnt
method [4] which was designed to assign rather than update probabilities. The
objective of this paper is to strengthen the ME method in two ways.
In [3] the axioms that define the ME method have been distilled down to
three. In this work the justification of the method is improved by considerably
weakening the axiom that deals with independent subsystems. We adopt a
consistency axiom similar to that proposed by Shore and Johnson [1]: When two
systems are independent it should not matter whether the inference procedure
treats them separately or jointly. The merit of such a consistency axiom is that
it is very compelling. Nevertheless, the mathematical implementation of the
axiom has been criticized by Karbelkar [5] and by Uffink [6]. In their view it fails
to single out the usual logarithmic entropy as the unique tool for updating. It
merely restricts the form of the entropy to a one-dimensional continuum labeled
by a parameter η. The resulting η-entropies are equivalent to those proposed
by Renyi [7] and by Tsallis [8] in the sense that they update probabilities in the
same way.
The main result of this paper is to go beyond the insights of Karlbelkar and
Uffink, and show that the consistency axiom selects a unique, universal value
for the parameter η and this value (η = 0) corresponds to the usual logarithmic
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entropy. The advantage of our approach is that it shows precisely how it is that
η-entropies with η 6= 0 are ruled out as tools for updating.
Our second objective is mostly pedagogical. The preeminent updating method
is based on Bayes’ rule and we want to discuss its relation with the ME method.
We start by drawing a distinction between Bayes’ theorem, which is a straight-
forward consequence of the product rule for probabilities, and Bayes’ rule, which
is the actual updating rule. We show that Bayes’ rule can be derived as a special
case of the ME method, a result that was first obtained by Williams [11, 12] long
before the logical status of the ME method had been sufficiently clarified. The
virtue of our derivation, which hinges on translating information in the form of
data into constraints that can be processed using ME, is that it is particularly
clear. It throws light on Bayes’ rule and demonstrates its complete compati-
bility with ME updating. A slight generalization of the same ideas shows that
Jeffrey’s updating rule is also a special case of the ME method.
2 Entropy as a tool for updating probabilities
Our objective is to devise a general method to update from a prior distribution
q(x) to a posterior distribution p(x) when new information becomes available.
By information, in its most general form, we mean a set of constraints on the
family of acceptable posterior distributions. Information is whatever constrains
our beliefs.
To carry out the update we proceed by ranking the allowed probability
distributions according to increasing preference. This immediately raises two
questions: (a) how is the ranking implemented and (b) what makes one distri-
bution preferable over another? The answer to (a) is that any useful ranking
scheme must be transitive (if P1 is better than P2, and P2 is better than P3,
then P1 is better than P3), and therefore it can be implemented by assigning a
real number S[P ] to each P in such a way that if P1 is preferred over P2, then
S[P1] > S[P2]. The preferred P is that which maximizes the “entropy” S[P ].
This explains why entropies are real numbers and why they are meant to be
maximized.
Question (b), the criterion for preference, is implicitly answered once the
functional form of the entropy S[P ] that defines the ranking scheme is chosen.
The basic strategy is inductive. We follow Skilling’s method of induction [2]:
(1) If an entropy S[P ] of universal applicability exists, it must apply to special
examples. (2) If in a certain example the best distribution is known, then
this knowledge constrains the form of S[P ]. Finally, (3) if enough examples
are known, then S[P ] will be completely determined. (Of course, the known
examples might turn out to be incompatible with each other, in which case
there is no universal S[P ] that accommodates them all.)
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that in this approach entropy is a tool for
reasoning which requires no interpretation in terms of heat, multiplicities, dis-
order, uncertainty, or amount of information. Entropy needs no interpretation.
We do not need to know what it means, we only need to know how to use it.
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The known special examples, which are called the “axioms” of ME, reflect
the conviction that what was learned in the past is important and should not be
easily ignored. The chosen posterior distribution should coincide with the prior
as closely as possible and one should only update those aspects of one’s beliefs
for which corrective new evidence has been supplied. The first two axioms are
listed below. (The motivation and detailed proofs are found in [3].)
Axiom 1: Locality. Local information has local effects.
When the new information does not refer to a domain D of the variable x the
conditional probabilities p(x|D) need not be revised. The consequence of the
axiom is that non-overlapping domains of x contribute additively to the entropy:
S[P ] =
∫
dxF (P (x), x) where F is some unknown function.
Axiom 2: Coordinate invariance. The ranking should not depend on the
system of coordinates.
The coordinates that label the points x are arbitrary; they carry no information.
The consequence of this axiom is that S[P ] =
∫
dxm(x)Φ(P (x)/m(x)) involves
coordinate invariants such as dxm(x) and P (x)/m(x), where the functionsm(x)
(which is a density) and Φ are, at this point, still undetermined.
Next we make a second use of the locality axiom and allow domain D to ex-
tend over the whole space. Axiom 1 then asserts that when there is no new infor-
mation there is no reason to change one’s mind. When there are no constraints
the selected posterior distribution should coincide with the prior distribution.
This eliminates the arbitrariness in the density m(x): up to normalizationm(x)
is the prior distribution, m(x) ∝ q(x).
In [3] the remaining unknown function Φ was determined using the following
axiom:
Old Axiom 3: Subsystem independence. When a system is composed of
subsystems that are believed to be independent it should not matter whether the
inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Let us be very explicit about what this axiom means. Consider a system com-
posed of two subsystems which our prior evidence has led us to believe are
independent. This belief is reflected in the prior distribution: if the subsystem
priors are q1(x1) and q2(x2), then the prior for the whole system is the prod-
uct q1(x1)q2(x2). Further suppose that new information is acquired such that
q1(x1) is updated to p1(x1) and that q2(x2) is updated to p2(x2). Nothing in
this new information requires us to revise our previous assessment of indepen-
dence, therefore there is no need to change our minds, and the function Φ must
be such that the prior for the whole system q1(x1)q2(x2) should be updated to
p1(x1)p2(x2).
This idea is implemented as follows: First we treat the two subsystems
separately. Suppose that for subsystem 1 maximizing
S1[P1, q1] =
∫
dx1 q1(x1)Φ
(
P1(x1)
q1(x1)
)
, (1)
subject to constraints C1 on the marginal distribution P1(x1) =
∫
dx2 P (x1, x2)
selects the posterior p1(x1). The constraints C1 could, for example, include
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normalization, or they could involve the known expected value of a function
f1(x1), ∫
dx1f1(x1)P1(x1) =
∫
dx1dx2 f1(x1)P (x1, x2) = F1 . (2)
Similarly, suppose that for subsystem 2 maximizing the corresponding S2[P2, q2]
subject to constraints C2 on P2(x2) =
∫
dx1 P (x1, x2) selects the posterior
p2(x2).
Next we treat the subsystems jointly and maximize the joint entropy,
S[P, q1q2] =
∫
dx1dx2 q1(x1)q2(x2)Φ
(
P (x1, x2)
q1(x1)q2(x2)
)
, (3)
subject to the precisely the same constraints on the joint distribution P . The
function Φ is determined by the requirement that the selected posterior be p1p2.
As shown in [3] this leads to the logarithmic form
S[P, q] = −
∫
dxP (x) log
P (x)
q(x)
. (4)
3 The new independence axiom
Next we replace our old axiom 3 by an axiom which is more convincing axiom
because it is an explicit requirement of consistency.
New Axiom 3: Consistency for independent subsystems. When a system
is composed of subsystems that are known to be independent it should not matter
whether the inference procedure treats them separately or jointly.
Again, we have to be very explicit about what this axiom means and how
it differs from the old one. When the subsystems are treated separately the
inference proceeds exactly as described before: for subsystem 1 maximize the
entropy S1[P1, q1] subject to the constraints C1 to select a posterior p1 and
similarly for subsystem 2 to select p2. The important difference is introduced
when the subsystems are treated jointly. Since we are only concerned with
those special examples where we know that the subsystems are independent,
we are required to search for the posterior within the restricted family of joint
distributions that take the form of a product P = P1P2; this is an additional
constraint over and above the original C1 and C2.
In the previous case we chose Φ so as to maintain independence because
there was no evidence against it. Here we impose independence by hand as an
additional constraint for the stronger reason that the subsystems are known to
be independent. At first sight it appears that the new axiom does not place
as stringent a restriction on the general form of Φ: it would seem that Φ has
been relieved of its responsibility of enforcing independence because it is up to
us to impose it explicitly by hand. However, as we shall see, the fact that we
seek an entropy S of general applicability and that we require consistency for
all possible independent subsystems is sufficiently restrictive.
4
The new constraint P = P1P2 is easily implemented by direct substitution.
Instead of maximizing the joint entropy, S[P, q1q2], we now maximize
S[P1P2, q1q2] =
∫
dx1dx2 q1(x1)q2(x2)Φ
(
P1(x1)P2(x2)
q1(x1)q2(x2)
)
, (5)
under independent variations δP1 and δP2 subject to the same constraints C1
and C2 and we choose Φ by imposing that the updating leads to the posterior
p1(x1)p2(x2).
3.1 Consistency for identical independent subsystems
Here we show that applying the axiom to subsystems that happen to be identical
restricts the entropy functional to a member of the one-parameter family given
by
Sη[P, q] = −
∫
dxP (x)
(
P (x)
q(x)
)η
for η 6= −1, 0 . (6)
Since entropies that differ by additive or multiplicative constants are equivalent
in that they induce the same ranking scheme, we could equally well have written
Sη[P, q] =
1
η(η + 1)
(
1−
∫
dxP η+1q−η
)
. (7)
This is convenient because the entropies for η = 0 and η = −1 can be obtained
by taking the appropriate limits. For η → 0 use yη = exp η log y ≈ 1 + η log y
to obtain the usual logarithmic entropy, S0[P, q] = S[P, q] in eq.(4). Similarly,
for η → −1 we get S−1[P, q] = S[q, P ].
The proof below is based upon and extends a previous proof by Karbelkar [5].
He showed that belonging to the family of η-entropies is a sufficient condition to
satisfy the consistency axiom for identical systems and he conjectured but did
not prove that this was perhaps also a necessary condition. Although necessity
was not essential to his argument it is crucial for ours. We show below that for
identical subsystems there are no acceptable entropies outside this family.
Proof
First we treat the subsystems separately. For subsystem 1 we maximize the
entropy S1[P1, q1] subject to normalization and the constraint C1 in eq.(2). In-
troduce Lagrange multipliers α1 and λ1,
δ
[
S1[P1, q1]− λ1
(∫
dx1f1P1 − F1
)
− α1
(∫
dx1 P1 − 1
)]
= 0, (8)
which gives
Φ′
(
P1(x1)
q1(x1)
)
= λ1f1(x1) + α1 , (9)
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where the prime indicates a derivative with respect to the argument, Φ′(y) =
dΦ(y)/dy. For subsystem 2 we need only consider the extreme situation where
the constraints C2 determine the posterior completely: P2(x2) = p2(x2).
Next we treat the subsystems jointly. The constraints C2 are easily imple-
mented by direct substitution and thus, we maximize the entropy S[P1p2, q1q2]
by varying over P1 subject to normalization and the constraint C1 in eq.(2).
Introduce Lagrange multipliers α and λ,
δ
[
S[P1p2, q1q2]− λ
(∫
dx1f1P1 − F1
)
− α
(∫
dx1 P1 − 1
)]
= 0, (10)
which gives ∫
dx2 p2Φ
′
(
P1p2
q1q2
)
= λ[p2]f1(x1) + α[p2] , (11)
where the multipliers λ and α are independent of x1 but could in principle be
functionals of p2.
The consistency condition that constrains the form of Φ is that if the solution
to eq.(9) is p1(x1) then the solution to eq.(11) must also be p1(x1), and this must
be true irrespective of the choice of p2(x2). Let us then consider a small change
p2 → p2+δp2 that preserves the normalization of p2. First introduce a Lagrange
multiplier α2 and rewrite eq.(11) as∫
dx2 p2Φ
′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
− α2
[∫
dx2 p2 − 1
]
= λ[p2]f1(x1) + α[p2] , (12)
where we have replaced P1 by the known solution p1 and thereby effectively
transformed eqs.(9) and (11) into an equation for Φ. The δp2(x2) variation
gives,
Φ′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
+
p1p2
q1q2
Φ′′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
=
δλ
δp2
f1(x1) +
δα
δp2
+ α2 . (13)
Next use eq.(9) to eliminate f1(x1),
Φ′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
+
p1p2
q1q2
Φ′′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
= A[
p2
q2
]Φ′
(
p1
q1
)
+B[
p2
q2
] , (14)
where
A[
p2
q2
] =
1
λ1
δλ
δp2
and B[
p2
q2
] = −
δλ
δp2
α1
λ1
+
δα
δp2
+ α2 , (15)
are at this point unknown functionals of p2/q2. Differentiating eq.(14) with
respect to x1 the B term drops out and we get
A[
p2
q2
] =
[
d
dx1
Φ′
(
p1
q1
)]
−1
d
dx1
[
Φ′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)
+
p1p2
q1q2
Φ′′
(
p1p2
q1q2
)]
, (16)
which shows thatA is not a functional but a mere function of p2/q2. Substituting
back into eq.(14) we see that the same is true for B. Therefore eq.(14) can be
written as
Φ′ (y1y2) + y1y2Φ
′′ (y1y2) = A(y2)Φ
′ (y1) +B(y2) , (17)
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where y1 = p1/q1, y2 = p2/q2, and A(y2), B(y2) are unknown functions of y2.
If we specialize to identical subsystems for which we can exchange the labels
1↔ 2, we get
A(y2)Φ
′ (y1) +B(y2) = A(y1)Φ
′ (y2) +B(y1) . (18)
To find the unknown functions A and B differentiate with respect to y2,
A′(y2)Φ
′ (y1) +B
′(y2) = A(y1)Φ
′′ (y2) (19)
and then with respect to y1 to get
A′(y1)
Φ′′ (y1)
=
A′(y2)
Φ′′ (y2)
= a = const . (20)
Integrating,
A(y1) = aΦ
′ (y1) + b . (21)
Substituting back into eq.(19) and integrating gives
B′(y2) = bΦ
′′ (y2) and B(y2) = bΦ
′ (y2) + c , (22)
where b and c are constants. We can check that A(y) and B(y) are indeed
solutions of eq.(18). Substituting into eq.(17) gives
Φ′ (y1y2) + y1y2Φ
′′ (y1y2) = aΦ
′ (y1)Φ
′ (y2) + b [Φ
′ (y1) + Φ
′ (y2)] + c . (23)
This is a peculiar differential equation. We can think of it as one differential
equation for Φ′ (y1) for each given constant value of y2 but there is a complication
in that the various (constant) coefficients Φ′ (y2) are themselves unknown. To
solve for Φ choose a fixed value of y2, say y2 = 1,
yΦ′′ (y)− ηΦ′ (y)− κ = 0 , (24)
where η = aΦ′ (1) + b − 1 and κ = bΦ′ (1) + c. To eliminate the constant κ
differentiate with respect to y,
yΦ′′′ + (1− η)Φ′′ = 0 , (25)
which is a linear homogeneous equation and is easy to integrate. For a generic
value of η the solution is
Φ′′(y) ∝ yη−1 ⇒ Φ′(y) = αyη + β . (26)
The constants α and β are chosen so that this is a solution of eq.(23) for all
values of y2 (and not just for y2 = 1). Substituting into eq.(23) and equating
the coefficients of various powers of y1y2, y1, and y2 gives three conditions on
the two constants α and β,
α(1 + η) = aα2, 0 = aαβ + bα, β = aβ2 + 2bβ + c . (27)
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The nontrivial (α 6= 0) solutions are α = (1 + η)/a and β = −b/a, while the
third equation gives c = b(1 − b)/4a. We conclude that for generic values of η
the solution of eq.(23) is
Φ(y) =
1
a
yη+1 −
b
a
y + C , (28)
where C is a new constant. Choosing a = −η(η + 1) and b = 1+ Ca we obtain
eq.(7).
For the special values η = 0 and η = −1 one can either first take the
limit of the differential eq.(25) and then find the relevant solutions, or one can
first solve the differential equation for general η and then take the limit of the
solution eq.(7) as described earlier. Either way one obtains (up to additive
and multiplicative constants which have no effect on the ranking scheme) the
entropies S0[P, q] = S[P, q] and S−1[P, q] = S[q, P ].
3.2 Consistency for non-identical subsystems
Let us summarize our results so far. The goal is to update probabilities by
ranking the distributions according to an entropy S that is of general applica-
bility. The functional form of the entropy S has been constrained down to a
member of the one-dimensional family Sη. One might be tempted to conclude
(see [5, 6]) that there is no S of universal applicability; that inferences about
different systems ought to be carried out with different η-entropies. But we have
not yet exhausted the full power of our new axiom 3.
To proceed further we ask: What is η? Is it a property of the individual
carrying out the inference or of the system under investigation? The former
makes no sense; we insist that the updating must be objective in that different
individuals with the same prior and the same information must make the same
inference. Therefore the “inference parameter” η must be a characteristic of the
system.
Consider two different systems characterized by η1 and η2. Let us further
suppose that these systems are independent (perhaps system 1 is here on Earth
while the other lives in a distant galaxy) so that they fall under the jurisdiction
of the new axiom 3; inferences about system 1 are carried out with Sη
1
[P1, q1]
while inferences about system 2 require Sη
2
[P2, q2]. For the combined system we
are also required to use an η-entropy Sη[P1P2, q1q2]. The question is what η do
we choose that will lead to consistent inferences whether we treat the systems
separately or jointly. The results of the previous section indicate that a joint
inference with Sη[P1P2, q1q2] is equivalent to separate inferences with Sη[P1, q1]
and Sη[P2, q2]. Therefore we must choose η = η1 and also η = η2 which is
possible only when η1 = η2. But this is not all: any other system whether here
on Earth or elsewhere that happens to be independent of the distant system 2
must also be characterized by the same inference parameter η = η2 = η1 even if
it is correlated with system 1. Thus all systems have the same η whether they
are independent or not.
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The power of a consistency argument resides in its universal applicability: if
a general expression for S[P, q] exists then it must be of the form Sη[P, q] where
η is a universal constant. The remaining problem is to determine this universal
η. One possibility is to determine η experimentally: are there systems for which
inferences based on a known value of η have repeatedly led to success? The
answer is yes; they are quite common.
The next step in our argument is provided by the work of Jaynes [4] who
showed that statistical mechanics and thus thermodynamics are theories of infer-
ence based on the value η = 0. His method, called MaxEnt, can be interpreted
as the special case of the ME when one updates from a uniform prior using the
Gibbs-Shannon entropy. Thus, it is an experimental fact without any known
exceptions that inferences about all physical, chemical and biological systems
that are in thermal equilibrium or close to it can be carried out by assuming
that η = 0. Let us emphasize that this is not an obscure and rare example
of purely academic interest; these systems comprise essentially all of natural
science. (Included is every instance where it is useful to introduce a notion of
temperature.)
In conclusion: consistency for non-identical systems requires that η be a uni-
versal constant and there is abundant experimental evidence for its value being
η = 0. Other η-entropies may be useful for other purposes but the logarith-
mic entropy S[P, q] in eq.(4) provides the only consistent ranking criterion for
updating probabilities that can claim general applicability.
4 Bayes updating
The two preeminent updating methods are the ME method discussed above
and Bayes’ rule. The choice between the two methods has traditionally been
dictated by the nature of the information being processed (either constraints or
observed data) but questions about their compatibility are regularly raised. Our
goal here is to show that these two updating strategies are completely consistent
with each other. Let us start by drawing a distinction between Bayes’ theorem
and Bayes’ rule.
4.1 Bayes’ theorem and Bayes’ rule
The goal here is to update our beliefs about the values of one or several quantities
θ ∈ Θ on the basis of observed values of variables x ∈ X and of the known
relation between them represented by a specific model. The first important point
to make is that attention must be focused on the joint distribution Pold(x, θ).
Indeed, being a consequence of the product rule, Bayes’ theorem requires that
Pold(x, θ) be defined and that assertions such as “x and θ” be meaningful; the
relevant space is neither X nor Θ but the product X ×Θ. The label “old”
is important. It has been attached to the joint distribution Pold(x, θ) because
this distribution codifies our beliefs about x and about θ before the information
contained in the actual data has been processed. The standard derivation of
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Bayes’ theorem invokes the product rule,
Pold(x, θ) = Pold(x)Pold(θ|x) = Pold(θ)Pold(x|θ) , (29)
so that
Pold(θ|x) = Pold(θ)
Pold(x|θ)
Pold(x)
. (Bayes’ theorem)
It is important to realize that at this point there has been no updating. Our
beliefs have not changed. All we have done is rewrite what we knew all along in
Pold(x, θ). Bayes’ theorem is an identity that follows from requirements on how
we should consistently assign degrees of belief. Whether the justification of the
product rule is sought through Cox’s consistency requirement and regraduation
or through a Dutch book betting coherence argument, the theorem is valid
irrespective of whatever data will be or has been collected. Our notation, with
the label “old” throughout, makes this point explicit.
The real updating from the old prior distribution Pold(θ) to a new posterior
distribution Pnew(θ) occurs when we take into account the values of x that have
actually been observed, which we will denote with a capital X . This requires a
new assumption and the natural choice is that the updated distribution Pnew(θ)
be given by Bayes’ rule,
Pnew(θ) = Pold(θ|X) . (Bayes’ rule)
Combining Bayes’ theorem with Bayes’ rule leads to the standard equation for
Bayes updating,
Pnew(θ) = Pold(θ)
Pold(X |θ)
Pold(X)
. (30)
The assumption embodied in Bayes’ rule is extremely reasonable: we maintain
those old beliefs about θ that are consistent with data values that have turned
out to be true. Data values that were not observed are discarded because they
are now known to be false.
This argument is indeed so compelling that it may seem unnecessary to seek
any further justification for the Bayes’ rule assumption. However, we deal here
with such a basic algorithm for information processing – it is fundamental to
all experimental science – that even such a self-evident assumption should be
carefully examined and its compatibility with the ME method should be verified.
4.2 Bayes’ rule from ME
Our first concern when using the ME method to update from a prior to a
posterior distribution is to define the space in which the search for the posterior
will be conducted. We argued above that the relevant space is the product
X ×Θ. Therefore the selected posterior Pnew(x, θ) is that which maximizes
S[P, Pold] = −
∫
dxdθ P (x, θ) log
P (x, θ)
Pold(x, θ)
(31)
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subject to the appropriate constraints.
Next, the information being processed, the observed data X , must be ex-
pressed in the form of a constraint on the allowed posteriors. Clearly, the family
of posteriors that reflects the fact that x is now known to be X is such that
P (x) =
∫
dθ P (x, θ) = δ(x −X) . (32)
This amounts to an infinite number of constraints: there is one constraint on
P (x, θ) for each value of the variable x and each constraint will require its
own Lagrange multiplier λ(x). Furthermore, we impose the usual normalization
constraint, ∫
dxdθ P (x, θ) = 1 . (33)
Maximize S subject to these constraints,
δ
{
S +
∫
dxλ(x)
[∫
dθ P (x, θ)− δ(x −X)
]
+ α
[∫
dxdθ P (x, θ)− 1
]}
= 0 ,
(34)
and the selected posterior is
Pnew(x, θ) = Pold(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
, (35)
where the normalization Z is
Z = e−α+1 =
∫
dxdθ Pold(x, θ) e
λ(x) , (36)
and the multipliers λ(x) are determined from eq.(32),
∫
dθ Pold(x, θ)
eλ(x)
Z
= Pold(x)
eλ(x)
Z
= δ(x−X) . (37)
Therefore, substituting eλ(x) back into eq.(35),
Pnew(x, θ) =
Pold(x, θ) δ(x−X)
Pold(x)
= δ(x−X)Pold(θ|x) . (38)
The new marginal distribution for θ is
Pnew(θ) =
∫
dxPnew(x, θ) = Pold(θ|X) , (39)
which is Bayes’ rule! Bayes updating is a special case of ME updating.
To summarize: the prior Pold(x, θ) = Pold(x)Pold(θ|x) is updated to the
posterior Pnew(x, θ) = Pnew(x)Pnew(θ|x) where Pnew(x) = δ(x −X) is fixed by
the observed data while Pnew(θ|x) = Pold(θ|x) remains unchanged. Note that
in accordance with the philosophy that drives the ME method one only updates
those aspects of one’s beliefs for which corrective new evidence has been supplied.
The generalization to situations where there is some uncertainty about the
actual data is straightforward. In this case the marginal P (x) in eq.(32) is not a
δ function but a known distribution PD(x). The selected posterior Pnew(x, θ) =
Pnew(x)Pnew(θ|x) is easily shown to be Pnew(x) = PD(x) with Pnew(θ|x) =
Pold(θ|x) remaining unchanged. This leads to Jeffrey’s conditionalization rule,
Pnew(θ) =
∫
dxPnew(x, θ) =
∫
dxPD(x)Pold(θ|x) . (40)
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5 Conclusions
We have shown that Skilling’s method of induction has led to a unique general
theory of inductive inference, the ME method. The whole approach is extremely
conservative. First, the axioms merely instruct us what not to update – do not
change your mind except when forced by new information. Second, the validity
of the method does not depend on any particular interpretation of the notion
of entropy – entropy needs no interpretation.
Our derivation of the consequences of the new axiom show that when applied
to identical subsystems they restrict the entropy to a member of the η-entropy
family. Its further application to non-identical systems shows that consistency
requires that η be a universal constant which must take the value η = 0 in order
to account for the empirical success of the inference theory we know as statistical
mechanics. Thus, the unique tool for updating probabilities is the logarithmic
relative entropy. Other entropies with η 6= 0 or those of Renyi or Tsallis are
ruled out; they may be useful for other purposes but not for inference.
Finally we explored the compatibility of Bayes and ME updating. After
pointing out the distinction between Bayes’ theorem and the Bayes’ updating
rule, we showed that Bayes’ rule is a special case of ME updating by translating
information in the form of data into constraints that can be processed using
ME.
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